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Negligent Interference with Contract-An Argument Against
Categorical Rejection: Applying a Duty/Risk Analysis to
Negligent Drug Testing
Negligent conduct is as anti-social as wilfully injurious conduct. The
interest of the community in the freedom of action of the individual
tolerates the one no more than the other.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Louisiana law regarding interference with contract is convoluted, to say the
least. Until 1989, Louisiana was the only state not to allow recovery for intentional
interference with contract. But then in 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spurney3 the
Louisiana Supreme Court recognized a very narrow action for intentional
interference, the exact parameters of which are still unclear. Some courts have
interpreted the supreme court jurisprudence4 to preclude an action for negligent, as
opposed to intentional, interference.5 However, other courts have sustained such
actions in some scenarios, such as in the context of negligent drug testing. 6 The
purpose of this comment is to examine the Louisianajurisprudence on interference
with contract in general, to explore the policy reasons behind the reluctance of
courts to impose liability for so-called "negligent interference," and ultimately, to
recommend that these negligence claims not be categorically rejected where the
application of a duty/risk analysis could adequately protect legitimate policy
concerns, specifically in the context of negligent drug testing.
1I. TORTiOUS INTERFERENCE witI CONTRACT
A. Generally
Intentional interference with contract "draws a line beyond which no member
of the community may go in intentionally intermeddling with the business affairs
Copyright 2000, by LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW.
I. Note. Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations, 31 Har. LRev. 1017.1021 (1918).
2. 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spurney, 538 So. 2d 228, 232 (La. 1989) (citations omitted).
3. 538 So. 2d 228 (La. 1989).
4. PPG Indus., Inc. v. Bean Dredging, 447 So. 2d 1058 (La. 1984); 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v.
Spumey, 538 So. 2d 228 (La. 1989); Great Southwest Fire Ins.. Co. v. CNA Ins. Co., 557 So. 2d 966
(La. 1990).
5. See, e.g., Inka's S'Coolwear, Inc. v. School Time, LLC., 725 So. 2d 496 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1998) (The 9 to 5 Fashions court "specifically repudiated recovery based upon negligent interference
with contract."); Crockett v. Cardona, 713 So. 2d 802, 806 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1998) ("Louisiana does
not allow and never has allowed recovery for the negligent interference with contractual relations");
Larsen v. Renard, 576 So. 2d 1188, 1190 (La. App. 3d Cir. 199 1) ("Liability for negligent interference
with contractual relations resulting in economic loss is not recognized in Louisiana.").
6. See, e.g., Lewis v. Aluminum Co. of America, 588 So. 2d 167 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991);
Elliott v. Laboratory Specialists, Inc., 588 So. 2d 175 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1991); Nehrenz v. Dunn, 593
So. 2d 915 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992).
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of others." 7 The right to recovery "is determined by balancing the interest of the
defendant in doing his otherwise lawful act and of the plaintiff in being free from
interference."' Justification, or a privilege to interfere, is found when the social
import of the defendant's interest in interfering outweighs the interest of the
plaintiff.' In distinguishing between permissible behavior and interference,
consideration is given to "the varying ethical standards of the community, and
especially the standards of business ethics."' While liability for tortious
interference has been criticized as contradicting "the foundation of the competitive
economic order in the United States,"" the privilege of competition precludes the
imposition of liability when the interference is among competitors to advance the
interferer's economic self interests.'2 Indeed, an injury which results from lawful,
competition is damnum absque injuria. " However, no such justification exists if
the interferer is motivated by spite, malice, or some other improper motive. '4 It is
only the latter brand of interference that is actionable.
Liability for interference with contract developed in the field of intentional
torts, and there has been no general recognition of any liability for negligent
interference.' 5 Intentional interference claims are defined from the aspect of duty.
7. 45 Am. Jur. 2d Interference J I (1964); Bruce iUncoln-Mercu y, Inc. v. Universal C.I.T.
Credit Corp., 325 F.2d 2 (3d Cir. 1963); see also Ellis v. City of Valdez, 686 P.2d 700 (Alaska 1984).
8. Jeffrey A. Schaefer, Tortious Interference with Real Estate Broker's Business Relationship
with Seller, 41 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 393, §10 (1985).
9. Charles E. Carpenter. Interference with Contract Relations, 41 Har,. L Rev. 728. 745
(1928).
10. 45 Am. Jur. 2d Interference § 1 (1964) (internal citations omitted).
11. Gina M. Orothe. Interference with Contract in the Competitive Marke tlace, 15 Win.
Mitchell L Rev. 453, 458 (1989).
12. See Carpnter, supra note 9, at 755-59.
13. Deon v. Kirby Lumber Co., 162 LA. 671, 679, 111 So. 55, 58 (1926) (loss without legal
injury).
14. Ran Corp. v. Hudesman, 823 P.2d 646 (Alaska 1991); Fleischer v. Hellmuth, Obata &
Kassabaum, Inc., 870 S.W.2d 832 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993). The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767
provides:
In determining whether an actor's conduct in intentionally interfering with a contract or a
prospective contractual relation of another is improper or not, consideration is given to the
following factors:
(a) the nature of the actor's conduct.
(b) the actor's motive,
(c) the interest of the other with which the actor's conduct interferes,
(d) the interest sought to be advanced by the actor,
(e) the social interest in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the
contractual interest of the other,
(f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the interference and
(g) the relations between the parties.
15. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766C, cmt. (a) (1977). See also Rockaway Blvd. Wrecking
& Lumber Co. v. Raylite Electric Corp., 26 A.D.2d 9 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966); Frank Horton & Co., Inc.
v. Diggs, 544 S.W.2d 313 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Local Joint Executive Board of Las Vegas v. Stern, 651
P.2d 637 (Nev. 1982); Aikens v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., 501 A.2d 277 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985);
Snow v. West, 440 P.2d 864 (Or. 1968); Peterson v. Zerr, 477 N.W.2d 230 (N.D. 1991); Alvord and
Swift v. Steward M. Muller Constr. Co., 385 N.E.2d 1238 (N.Y. 1978).
[Vol. 60
COMMENTS
The crucial inquiry is whether there is a duty not to intentionally interfere with
another's contractual relations by conduct that is otherwise lawful. It is not the
underlying conduct itself which is tortious, but rather engaging in the conduct for
the purpose of interfering with another's contractual relations. "But for" the
intentional interference, the conduct would not be tortious. On the other hand, in
a negligent interference claim, the conduct itself is tortious because, by definition,
it is negligent. Therefore, what is often labeled as "negligent interference with
contract" is not really "interference with contract" at all, but rather an ordinary
negligence claim containing interference with contractual relations as one element
of the damages. The question is not whether there is a duty "not" to negligently
interfere with another's contractual relations. Indeed, no one asks whether a
negligent driver owes a duty "not" to damage another car or "not" to physically
injure another motorist. There is already an independent duty "not" to be
negligent. Therefore the inquiry becomes whether the resulting damage is within
the scope of the risk associated with being negligent.
One cannot evaluate whether liability should be imposed for negligent
interference with contract without considering the relationship between the
underlying negligent conduct and the resulting contractual interference. For
example, it is settled law that a plaintiff may recover lost "earnings or profits from
[his] business, occupation or profession" as an element of damages in a personal
injury action. 6 While this could be called a negligent interference claim in that the
tortfeasor negligently interfered with the injured person's employment or
occupation, the courts instead analyze such claims from the aspect of damages.
The question is whether the damages are within the scope of the risk associated
with a breach of the duty owed. Where a person is physically injured in an
automobile accident, the courts have found that the lost wages suffered by the
injured person are within the scope of the risk associated with driving negligently. 17
On the other hand, courts are reluctant to allow recovery for pecuniary loss
unaccompanied by physical injury. One example would be the driver who loses
a multimillion dollar deal because someone else's negligence caused an automobile
accident that blocked off the entire interstate, making it impossible for the driver
to make his meeting in time to close the deal. The driver then seeks recovery from
the negligent motorist for his lost profits. Such indirect claims are almost
universally rejected, as they do not fall within the scope of the risk of driving
negligently. The result is that while a motorist who is physically injured by the
negligent motorist may recover for his lost wages or profits," the other drivers who
are not physically injured cannot. The rationale underlying this distinction is that
while physical damage inflicted by a tortfeasor has a self-defining limit (i.e., one
negligent motorist can only physically harm a limited and easily ascertainable
number of other persons), economic relations are so intertwined that disruption of
16. Laville v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 178 So. 2d 464, 468 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1965)
(internal citation omitted).
17. See id.
18. See id.
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one may have far-reaching consequences. 9 Claims for purely economic loss thus
present "the potential for liability of enormous scope, with no easily marked
intermediate points and no ready recourse to traditional liability-limiting devices
such as intervening cause."' However, the difficulty of determining where to
draw the line in limiting liability for non-physical damages has not preventedthe
recognition of other causes of action, such as negligent infliction of emotional
distress" and negligent misrepresentation.' Likewise, it should not preclude the
recovery of interference damages absent physical injury in some contexts.
Unfortunately, some courts are looking to the supreme court's decisions on
intentional interference and categorically rejecting any claim which they perceive
to be one for "negligent interference."
B. The Louisiana Supreme Court Decisions
The Louisiana Supreme Court first considered whether to recognize a cause
of action for inducing a breach of contract or interfering with contractual relations
in Kline v. Eubanks.3 In Kline, the plaintiff sued the defendant for inducing a
plantation laborer to leave his job in violation of his employment contract with the
plaintiff. The court found no cause of action under Louisiana Civil Code article
2315, noting that when the article was adopted the present system of labor was
unknown. The Kline court found no necessity for the new remedy.2s Although the
court rejected a cause of action for inducing breach, it noted that in any event, the
defendant's actions were not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's damages since
the laborer who deserted his employment was a free agent.26
19. David W. Robertson. Recovery in Louisiana Tort Law for Intangible Economic Loss:
Negligence Actions and the Tort of Intentional Interference with Contractual Relations, 46 [A. L Rev.
737. 741 (1986).
20. Id.
21. Moresi v. State of Louisiana, 567 So. 2d 1081 (LA. 1990) (recognizing a cause of action for
negligent infliction of emotional distress, but requiring the "especial likelihood of genuine and serious
mental distress, arising from the special circumstances, which serves as a guarantee that the claim is
not spurious").
22. Baiev. V.P. Exterminatorn 625 So. 2d 1007 (LA. 1993) (recognizing a cause of action for
negligent misrepresentation utilizing a duty/risk analysis).
23. 109 La. 241.33 So. 211 (1902); seealsoCustv. Item Co., 200 La. 515,8 So. 2d 361 (La.
1942).
24. La. Civ. Code art. 2315 provides in part: "Every act whatever of man that causes damages
to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it."
25. Kline v. Eubanks, 109 La. 241, 247, 33 So. 211, 213 (1902). However, this delict was
recognized by Louisiana's civilian sibling. France. The Cour de Cassation fust declared that facilitation
of an employee's breach of contract was a tortious act in 1908. Vernon V. Palmer, Historical Origins
of the Civilian Action Against Interference with Contract Rights in France: Louisiana Perspective on
a Road Not Taken, 6 & 7 Tul. Civ. LF. 131, 138 (1991). In France, employment contract cases were
"the leading edge of the jurisprudential development" of delictual actions for tortious interference. Id.
at 146.
26. Kline. 109 La. at 245. 33 So. at 213.
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Eighty-seven years after Kline, Louisiana recognized a limited action for
intentional interference with contract in 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spurney. However,
a "crack in the resistance"'2 of the courts to interference claims had appeared five
years earlier as the result of two other decisions, PPG Industries, Inc. v. Bean
Dredging2 S and Sanborn v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc."
.1. The Early Jurisprudence-PPG Industries and Sanborn
In PPG Industries, Inc. v. Bean Dredging," the defendant's dredging
operations caused damage to Texaco's natural gas pipeline.3 As a result, Texaco
was unable to fulfill its contract to supply natural gas to the plaintiff, who
consequently had to obtain fuel from another source at an increased cost. Plaintiff
filed suit to recover the increased cost of obtaining natural gas.32 The defendant
filed an exception of no cause of action, contending that Louisiana has never
recognized the right of recovery for negligent interference with contractual
relations.33
The Louisiana Supreme Court characterized the case as bringing "into focus
the broad question of recovery of an indirect economic loss incurred by a party who
had a contractual relationship with the owner of property negligently damaged by
a tortfeasor."I The court noted that in previous cases concerning this issue,
Louisiana courts had categorically denied recovery without analyzing the
problem.3" Rather than following this mechanical approach, the PPG court applied
a full duty/risk analysis before reaching its conclusion.
In analyzing the prior jurisprudence,' the PPG court asserted that the
possibility of multiple actions and an unforeseeable extension of liability may have
influenced the previous courts in denying such claims "as a matter of public
policy."37 Recognizing that imposing liability on the tortfeasor could create
liability "in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate
class,"3 the court asserted that a policy decision is necessary to limit the recovery
of damages: "Policy considerations determine the reach of the rule, and there must
be an ease of association between the rule of conduct, the risk of injury, and the
27. Bruce V. Schewe, Developments in the Law, 1989-90. Obligations, 51 La. L Rev. 361, 368
(1990).
28. 447 So. 2d 1058 (La. 1984).
29. 448 So. 2d 91 (La. 1984).
30. 447 So. 2d 1058 (La. 1984).
31. Id. at 1060.
32. Id.
33. id.
34. Id. at 1059.
35. Id.
36. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 48 S.Ct. 134 (1927); Forcum-James
Co., Inc. v. Duke Transp. Co., 231 La. 953, 93 So. 2d 228 (1957).
37. PPG Industries, 447 So. 2d at 1061-62 (citations omitted).
38. Id. (quoting Ultramnares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (1931)).
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loss sought to be recovered."39 Here, the court concluded that althoughthe case
fell literally within the expansive terms of Article 2315, the plaintiff could not
recover because his damages did not fall within the scope of the risk.'.
The significance of the supreme court's decision was not the outcome of.thedecision, but rather the analysis. utilized by the court in reaching its decision.
Although the economic loss suffered by the plaintiff was the indirect result of
actual property damage, the defendant characterized the claim as one for negligentinterference. Instead of categorically rejecting the plaintiff's demands as a
"negligent interference with contract" action, the court applied a duty/risk analysis.Since PPG, the lower courts have consistently found no cause of action for damage
to contractual relations that resulted from a negligent act towards a third party,
which consequently damaged the plaintiff.4' These results arejustified not because
the damages sustained were from negligent interference, but rather because theharm to the plaintiff was too far removed to be within the scope of the risk
contemplated by the duty the defendant owed to the third party. There was no ease
of association between the duty owed and the harm incurred. As such, a duty/risk
analysis limits the liability, eliminating the unforeseeable extension of liability thathad prompted the earlier blanket prohibition against allowing any recovery for
indirect economic losses.
In the same year of the PPG decision, the Supreme Court once again
considered a claim for intentional interference with contract similar to the one
rejected earlier in Kline.' In Sanborn v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc.,' 3 thedefendant was the former employer of the plaintiff. The plaintiff had worked for
the defendant under a work visa in the Middle East. Eight months after the
employment relationship ended, plaintiff desired to work for a new employer and
requested that the defendant release him from the previous work visa so that a new
one could be issued. The defendant refused, and the plaintiff was unable to fulfillhis employment agreement with his new employer. The plaintiff then sued for
tortious interference. The Louisiana Supreme Court found that the plaintiff had not
alleged that the defendant owed him a duty or that any duty was breached.
However, under the immigration laws of the host country, an employer was
required to notify the administration within 48 hours of the termination of an
employee working under a work visa. The Sanborn court found that this legal duty,
39. PPG Industries. 447 So. 2d at 1061-62 (quoting Hill v. Lundin & Assoc., Inc., 260 LA. 542,
256 So. 2d 620 (1972)).
40. PPG Industries, 447 So. 2d at 1060.
41. See Community Coffee Co., nc. v. Tri-Parish Constr. & Materials. Inc., 490 So. 2d 1109(La. App. Ist Cir. 1986) (no cause of action where defendant snagged and tore down electric powerlines and the resulting power outage caused damaged to plaintiff); Professional Answering Serv., Inc.
v. Central La. Elec. Co., 521 So. 2d 549 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988) (no cause of action where defendant
negligently felled trees on power fine and resulting power surge caused damage to plaintiff); Babin v.Texaco Inc., 449 So. 2d 718 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984) (loss of employment to mine workers was not
within the scope of protection intended by duty of oil drilling company not to damage salt mine); see
also Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. v. Texaco, Inc., 467 So. 2d 1141 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985).
42. See supra text accompanying notes 23-26.
43. 448 So. 2d 91 (La. 1984).
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coupled with Louisiana's strong public policy against non-compete clauses in
employment contracts, might indeed support the finding of a duty owed to the
plaintiff." The court reversed the trial court's dismissal and remanded to allow
plaintiff to amend his petition.
What is especially significant about the Sanborn decision is the suggestion by
the Louisiana Supreme Court that a claim for tortious interference with contract
might be actionable. The court intimated in a footnote that although the issue was
not presented in the Sanborn case,
were plaintiff to allege and prove defendant intentionally and willfully
interfered with plaintiff's contract with [his new employer], that such
intentional interference was the proximate cause of the failure of the
contract, and that defendant's actions were motivated by malice, or at
least not by a significant interest of its own, he might well be entitled to
relief.4'
However, the court noted that an opinion on the subject at that time would be
advisory at best." This "obvious invitation" 7 was soon accepted, as the issue was
squarely presented in 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spurney.
2. Intentional Interference-9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spurney
In 9 to 5 Fashions Inc., v. Spurney," the Louisiana Supreme Court removed
the absolute bar for actions based on tortious interference with contract,
recognizing the action in a very limited way. The plaintiff, 9 to 5 Fashions, was a
uniform supplier who had a contract with the Louisiana World Exposition, Inc.
(LWE). The defendant, Spumey, was the chief executive officer of LWE. 9 to 5
Fashions alleged that Spurney had intentionally and negligently interfered with the
performance of the contract between 9 to 5 Fashions and LWE, causing
performance of the contract to be more burdensome and costly.49
The 9 to5 Fashions court criticized the Kline court's limitation of Article 2315
to problems known at the time of the Code's drafting, observing that the "basic
concept of a civil code is that of a statement of general principles of law capable
44. Id. at 94.
45. Id. at 95 n.5
46. Id.
47. Frank L Maraist & Thomas C. Galligan, Louisiana Tort Law 120-3 (1996).
48. 538 So. 2d 228 (La. 1989).
49. Spumey had initially recommended another firm for the uniform contract and 9 to 5 Fashions
sued for restraint of trade. Spumey induced 9 to 5 Fashions to dismiss the suit by agreeing to
recommend them for the contract. 9 to 5 Fashions alleged that after the contract was awarded. Spumey
delayed in appointing an LWE employee to coordinate the design and supply of the uniforms, and that
the employee who was eventually assigned had no experience with uniform supply coordination. 9 to
5 Fashions alleged that Spumey's delay resulted in their ordering too much material, effecting a loss
of profits on the contract. The trial court found that Spumey was carrying out a "personal vendetta"
against 9 to 5 Fashions.
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of governing the affairs of present and future generations." The 9 to 5 Fashions
court referred to the bar of such actions as "anachronistically unjust when
compared with this court's application of the delictual principles to other issues and
circumstances."" Nonetheless, the court expressed its intention not "to adopt
whole and undigested the fully expanded common law doctrine of interference with
contract."'52 The court also cautioned that "[s]ome aspects of this tort have been
subjected to serious criticisms, leaving open a good many questions about the basis
of liability and defense, the types of contract or relationship to be protected, and thekinds of interference that will be actionable."53 The court recognized "only a
corporate officer's duty to refrain from intentional and unjustified interference with
the contractual relation between his employer and a third person."'
The action recognized in 9 to 5 Fashions is rather anomalous. The typicalinterference action involves three parties, two parties contractually bound and a
third party who interferes with that contract. However, in 9 to 5 Fashions the
action is essentially only between two parties contractually bound. Since a
corporation can only act through its agents, the action is one of a corporation
breaching its own contract through actions of its representative, the corporate
officer. When a contract is breached, the non-breaching party will have a remedy
in contract for the breach, and a cause of action in tort should therefore be
unnecessary. It was the insolvency of the corporation which prompted the plaintiff
to seek to impose personal liability upon the officer, who would be covered by the
corporation's officer liability insurance policy. The peculiar facts of the case have
created confusion as to what exactly constitutes actionable interference in
Louisiana, as "the circuit courts have continually split (even within a circuit itself)
over whether 9 to 5 Fashions should be expanded."" While the 9 to 5 Fashions
court may not have intended its newly recognized cause of action to be so limited,
many lower courts have refused to expand the cause of action beyond the narrow
facts of that case. 6
50. 9 to 5 Fashions, 538 So. 2d at 233 (emphasis added).
51. Id. at 234. See PPG Indus. Inc. v. Bean Dredging, 447 So. 2d 1058 (La. 1984) (abrogating
the rule that flatly prohibited recovery for intangible economic loss produced by negligent conduct); see
also. Sanborn v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 448 So. 2d 91 (La. 1984) (suggesting that intentional
tortious interference with contract rights may be actionable).
52. 9 to 5 Fashions, 538 So. 2d at 234.
53. Id. (citations omitted).
54. Id. The 9 to 5 Fashions court delineated the elements of an intentional interference with
contract action:
(I) the existence of a contract or a legally protected interest between the plaintiff and the
corporation; (2) the corporate officer's knowledge of the contract; (3) the officer's
intentional inducement or causation of the corporation to breach the contract or his
intentional rendition of its performance impossible or more burdensome; (4) absence ofjustification on the part of the officer; (5) causation of damages to the plaintiff by the breach
of contract or difficulty of its performance brought about by the officer.
Id.
55. Calliope Coaches. Inc. v. Vannier. 1998 WL 315437, at *2 (E.D. La. 1998).
56. See Tallo v. Stroh Brewery Co., 544 So. 2d 452 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989), writ denied. 547
So. 2d 355 (La. 1989); Accredited Sur. and Cas. Co. v. McElveen, 631 So. 2d 563 (La. App. 3d Cir.
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Many courts have interpreted 9 to 5 Fashions as precluding an action for
negligent interference.5 7 The 9 to 5 Fashions court did note that interference with
contract had its modern inception in malice and had remained almost entirely an
intentional tort, and that "in general, liability has not been extended to the various
forms of negligence by which performance of a contract may be prevented or
rendered more burdensome."'" In addition, due to the fiduciary duties owed by a
corporate officer to the corporation and its shareholders, he should enjoy immunity
from personal liability for negligent interference with the corporation's contracts
with third persons. The officer's primary duty is to the corporation, and if he is
threatened with the prospect of personal liability for negligent interference, he may
not put the corporation's interests above the third party's interests. The 9 to 5
Fashions court reasoned that a corporate officer's "fidelity and freedom of action
aimed toward corporate benefit should not be curtailed by undue fear of personal
liability" 59
Arguably, the policy reasons for rejecting an action for negligent interference
within a fiduciary relationship are not applicable to other forms of negligent
interference. 9 to 5 Fashions should not be interpreted as an absolute bar to a
negligent interference claim The 9 to 5 Fashions court criticized the
"anachronistically unjust" bar of Kline,' and approvingly referred to PPG
Industries, Inc. v. Bean Dredging,6 in which the Louisiana Supreme Court
replaced the rule prohibiting recovery for intangible economic loss with a duty/risk
analysis. While expressing its intent to proceed with caution, the 9 to 5 Fashions
court did not expressly preclude an action for negligent interference in the
appropriate case. Although the court correctly noted that interference claims are
almost always intentional torts, the reluctance to find a duty not to negligently
interfere should not be interpreted to disallow recovery of interference damages
where an independent duty exists, which is exactly what some courts are doing by
categorically rejecting such claims.
3. Negligent Interference-Great Southwest Fire Insurance Co. v. CNA
Insurance Co.
When squarely presented with a negligent interference claim, the Louisiana
Supreme Court declined to impose liability. In Great Southwest Fire Insurance
Co. v. CNA Insurance Co.,62 an excess liability insurance carrier sued the primary
insurer, seeking to recover sums it had to pay due to the alleged bad faith failure
of the primary insurer to defend properly and settle a lawsuit against their common
1994), writ denied, 637 So. 2d 483 (La. 1994); Yoes v. Shell Oil Co.. 657 So. 2d 241 (La. App. 5th Cir.
1995); Lynn v. Berg Mechanical, Inc., 582 So. 2d 902 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991).
57. See cases cited supra note 5.
58. 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spuney, 538 So. 2d 228, 232 (La. 1989).
59. Id. at 232.
60. Id. at 234.
61. 447 So. 2d 1058 (La. 1984).
62. 557 So. 2d 966 (La. 1990).
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insured.6 The Great Southwest court found that the primary insurer owed no duty
to the excess insurer, reasoning that to find such a duty would, in effect, be to
recognize something very similar to an action for negligent interference with
contract." The court referred to its recent recognition in 9 to 5 Fashions "of a
narrowly drawn action for intentional interference" and the 9 to 5 Fashions court's
intention to "proceed with caution in expanding that cause of action."' The Great
Southwest court reiterated that "except for a very few cases to the contrary, there
is little authority for negligent interference with contract in general."
In concluding that the primary insurer did not owe a duty to the excess insurer.
the Great Southwest court considered both the likelihood that any duty recognized
would evolve to include a duty to avoid negligent interference, and the difficulty
of reserving such a negligent interference action to only excess insurers. However,
the vast majority of factors cited by the court were related to the unique realm of
insurance. 7 Just as the fiduciary obligations owed by a corporate officer in 9 to 5
Fashions required that negligent interference actions not be allowed in that context,
the fiduciary obligations owed by an insurer to the insured and the highly regulated
nature of insurance protection in general compelled a similar limitation in Great
Southwest. The refusal to recognize a negligent interference action in these
circumstances should not be applied universally to all actions which do not involve
the same concerns.
It is significant that the Louisiana Supreme Court in Great Southwest did not
categorically reject the negligent interference claim, but instead utilized a duty/risk
analysis. Since the plaintiff alleged bad faith on the part of the defendant, it could
be argued that the action was one for intentional interference. However, the Great
Southwest court never considered whether the elements of intentional interference
under 9 to 5 Fashions were met. Since the court based its decision on the existence
vel non of a duty owed, it would seem to follow that interference actions should not
be categorically rejected if the facts are outside the scope of 9 to 5 Fashions or if
the claim is essentially one for negligent interference.
Claims that could be categorized as negligent interference should not be
categorically rejected. The previous Louisiana Supreme Court decisions rejecting
negligent interference were justified for various reasons. In PPG, the plaintiff's
harm was too remote to be within the scope of the risk. In 9 to 5 Fashions, the
fiduciary obligations owed to the defendant's corporation precluded the finding of
a duty. In Great Southwest, the competing obligations of a primary insurer and an
excess insurer precipitated the same result. In none of these cases did the
63. Id. at 966.
64. Id. at 969.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 970 (citations omitted).
67. Specifically, "the substantial although indirect protection that is already provided insurers
legislatively by subrogation, the injustice and inefficiency that may be produced by encouraging
insurers with independent rights to intervene in litigious matters in competition with their insureds, and
the effect upon insurance administration and rates of requiring primary insurers' attorneys to serve three
masters." Great Southwest, 557 So. 2d at 971.
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Louisiana Supreme Court categorically reject the action as one for "negligent
interference." The term itself is superfluous and misleading, since there is really
no such thing as a negligent interference action. An interference is either
intentional or it is negligent. If negligent, it is subsumed into the broader realm of
negligence actions. Courts should abandon the "rock-strewn path of 'negligent
interference with contract' for more familiar tort terrain." 8 In a negligence action,
a duty/risk analysis is fully competent to impose liability where warranted and yet
not extend liability beyond the scope of any duty owed. Such an analysis would
impose liability where there exists an ease of association between an actor's
negligent conduct and damage to a third party's contractual relations where none
of the policy reasons asserted for denying a so-called "negligent interference"
action are implicated. An action for negligent drug testing is the prime example.
III. NEGLIcENT DRUG TESTING
Perhaps the most persuasive argument for allowing recovery for at least some
forms of negligent interference is in the area of negligent employment testing.
Many employers require some form of testing, including drug screens, polygraph
examinations, and merit-based tests, as a condition of employment. The most
pervasive testing is for illegal drugs. In several cases, employees have been
terminated because of an allegedly false positive result which was due to the
negligence of the testing laboratory. Some Louisiana courts have categorically
rejected such claims as "negligent interference with contract" actions. Others have
allowed recovery by application of a duty/risk analysis. The Louisiana Supreme
Court has not yet been confronted with the issue.
A. The Louisiana Jurisprudence
The first Louisiana court to consider whether a drug testing laboratory is liable
for negligence which culminates in the termination of the testee was the first circuit
in Herbert v. Placid Refining Co." The employer refinery contracted with a drug
testing laboratory to collect and test urine samples from all of its employees,
including Herbert. The lab reported to the refinery that Herbert's urine sample
disclosed the presence of THC, the active ingredient in marijuana. Herbert and
nine other employees whose urine tested positive were terminated. Herbert sued
the lab for negligence, alleging that the lab had a duty "to analyze his body fluids
in a manner that utilized State [sic] of the art technology and was fair and
accurate," and that the lab "failed to prevent melanin interference with their THC
analysis because of inadequate laboratory methodology."'"
68. Green Mountain Power Corp., v. General Electric Corp., 496 F. Supp. 169, 175 (D. Vt.
1980).
69. 564 So. 2d 371 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1990).
70. Id. at 372.
71. Id.
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The first circuit affirmed a summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's suit. The
Herbert court discussed Johnson v. Delchamps," and adopted its rationale as its
own. 7 In analyzing Herbert's claim against the lab, the court stated that in order
for him to prevail, he "must show some noncontractual (tort) duty flowing from
[the lab] to himself.""' Herbert "asserted that [the lab] owed him a duty to properly
analyze his body fluids," and the lab's breach of that duty caused him to be
summarily terminated by the refinery." However, the court rejected his claims and
found that the lab had a contractual duty to the refinery, not Herbert, to properly
analyze his urine. 6 The court found that the lab owed him "no duty to protect
against this risk. Louisiana law does not recognize a cause of action for negligent
interference with contract rights.""
The fourth circuit has reached a different conclusion. In Lewis v. Aluminum
Co. ofAmerica,7s the facts were almost identical to those in Hebert, except that the
plaintiff was an independent contractor who was offered the opportunity to gain
employment status and was instructed to undergo drug testing. He tested positive,
and as a consequence was not made a regular employee and had his independent
contractor status terminated. Although he obtained an independent test showing
he was drug-free, his employer refused to reconsider its position. Lewis sued the
drug testing labs alleging negligence.79 He further alleged that the false report
"affected his ability to find other employment and damaged his general reputation
in the community." IThe Lewis court correctly noted that in a negligence action, a duty/risk analysis
is utilized to determine if the defendant's conduct constitutes fault in that it
amounts to a breach of a legal duty to protect against a particular risk.8 While
recognizing that liability had "not been extended to various forms of negligent
interference with contract," the court found that the plaintiff had stated a cause of
action in general negligence, alleging "the breach of the duty to perform the drug
tests in a competent and non-negligent manner."82 The court found an ease of
association between the rule of law contained in Articles 2315 and 2316 and the
risk of injury sustained by the plaintiff.83
72. 897 F.2d 808 (5th Cir. 1990) (no cause of action against employer for termination of at-will
employee on the basis of a negligently administered polygraph examination).
73. Herbert, 564 So. 2d at 373.
74. Id.
75. id. at 374 (citations omitted).
76. Id. (citations omitted).
77. Id. (citing Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co., 557 So. 2d 966 (La. 1990); 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v.
Spumey, 538 So. 2d 228 (La. 1989); PPG Industries. Inc. v. Bean Dredging, 447 So. 2d 1058 (La.
1984); Professional Answering Say., Inc. v. Central L.a. Elec. Co., Inc., 521 So. 2d 549 (La. App. Ist
Cir. 1988)).
78. 588 So. 2d 167 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991).
79. Id. at 169.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 170-71.
82. Id. at 170.
83. Id.
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The court found that the "precept that liability does not extend to negligent
interference with contract rights" was not applicable here. " The employee was not
an unknown third party. To the contrary, when the lab analyzed plaintiff's sample,
it was aware that negligent testing on its part could produce a false positive result
which could damage both the employee's "reputation and his employment
opportunities." 5 The court found that the damages were directly foreseeable and
the chance of harm was not remote. Therefore, extending the lab's liability to
encompass plaintiff's harm did not create an undue burden upon the lab's freedom
of action: "Instead, it should foster a greater sense of responsibility within it to
perform its drug testing services in a skillful and competent manner."'"
The Lewis court found that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action in
negligence, regardless of the contract between the lab and plaintiff's employer and
the plaintiff's status as an at-will employee."' Although employment is terminable
at will, the court found that "the employment is a subsisting relationship, of value
to the employee, until it is terminated. Thus, while the possibility of employment
termination at any time affects the amount of damages sustained by the employee,
it should not affect the employee's right of recovery."8" Likewise, in Nehrenz v.
Dunn, 9 the fourth circuit found that a terminated employee had stated a cause of
action in general negligence based on a breach of the testing lab's duty to perform
drug tests in a competent and non-negligent manner and that the plaintiff's alleged
injuries were within the scope of that duty.'
The fifth circuit found a non-contractual obligation between the testee and the
lab in Elliott v. Laboratory Specialists, Inc.,9" adding that to suggest that the lab
owed the employee no duty to analyze his body fluid in a scientifically reasonable
manner was "an abuse of fundamental fairness and justice."' At trial, the
employee's experts testified that the testing procedures used by the lab were
improper and the chain of custody protocol was inadequate.93 In upholding the
jury's award of $25,000, the court found that the lab "should be held responsible
for its conduct. The risk of harm in our society to an individual because of a false-
positive drug test is so significant that any individual wrongfully accused of drug
usage by his employer is within the scope of protection under the law."" The
Elliott court found that testing laboratories owe a duty of care to tested employees,
despite their contractual relationship with the employer: "Privity of contract should
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 170-71.
88. Id. at 171 n.4 (citations omitted).
89. 593 So. 2d 915 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992).
90. Id. at 917.
91. 588 So. 2d 175 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1991).
92. Id. at 176.
93. Id.
94. Id.
20001
LOUISIANA LAWREVIEW
never excuse a duty imposed by law on the conduct of individuals towards another
in a reasonable society."'
Although the second circuit has not been presented with the issue of negligent
drug testing, language in another case suggests that the court might follow the first
circuit's rejection of such a claim. In Carter v. Smith,9 the issue was whether a
motorist who was not physically injured during an automobile accident could
recover damages for her loss of employment which resulted from the accident.'
While ultimately concluding that the defendant's "negligent breach of duty to drive
safely does not encompass the risk of a subsequent termination of contract between
the plaintiff and a third party," the court noted that the true nature of the case was
one for interference with contract. The court read Great Southwest as holding that
negligent interference with a contract is not a cause of action." It found Herbert
v. Placid Refining Co.I" to be analogous, and noted that the analytical method
utilized in Herbert was more persuasive than the opposite conclusion drawn by the
fourth circuit.' However, the Smith court did concede that an "argument can be
made that loss of job is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of, and easily
associated with, a false positive drug test, negligently obtained," an ease of
association which was "simply not the case here.""
Whether or not an employee has a cause of action against a drug testing lab for
negligent testing is unsettled in mostjurisdictions. Ironically, while Louisiana was
the last jurisdiction to allow intentional interference claims, it is leading the way
in allowing negligence actions in this context. The fourth and fifth circuit cases
allowing recovery are often cited by other jurisdictions that allow recovery.13 The
first circuit has denied recovery. The second and third circuits, along with the
Louisiana Supreme Court, have yet to decide the issue. When these courts are
confronted with the issue of negligent testing, the proper approach would be to
conduct a duty/risk analysis and allow recovery.
B. A Duty/Risk Approach to Negligent Drug Testing Claims
A claim should not be categorically rejected as one for negligent interference
with contract. In a true interference action, it is the conduct of interfering with the
contractual relation which is proscribed. The question is whether there is a duty
95. Id.
96. 607 So. 2d 6 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1992).
97. The plaintiff was a driver and caretaker for a handicapped patient, who was riding in the car
with the plaintiff when an accident occuned. The accident frightened the patient to such an extent that
she refused to tide in the car with the plaintiff. As a result, the patient's mother terminated the plaintiff.
98. Carter, 607 So. 2d at 6.
99. Id. at 7.
100. 564 So. 2d 371 (La. App. I st Cir. 1990).
101. Carter, 607 So. 2d at 8.
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., Stinson v. Physicians Immediate Care, Ltd., 646 N.E.2d 930 (il. App. 1995) (drug-
testing laboratory owes a duty of reasonable care to persons whose specimens it tests for employers or
prospective employers).
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to protect another's contractual relations, or at least not to do an act which
interferes in such relations. Where conduct is itself negligent or tortious, the
question should not be whether there is a duty not to negatively impact another's
contractual relations, but rather whether the interference as a consequence of
independently negligent conduct is within the scope of the risk. If a duty exists,
and the interference is within the scope of the risk, then the imposition of liability
should not be precluded simply because it might be categorized as "negligent
interference with contract." Therefore, the proper resolution is to determine
whether a duty is owed, and if so, the corresponding scope of the risk of a breach
thereof.
1. Laboratories Owe a Duty to Perform Drug Tests in a Non-negligent
Manner
In the negligent drug testing cases, the question is whether a drug testing
laboratory owes a duty to the testee. The Herbert court found no such duty existed,
and that the lab owed the plaintiff "no duty to protect against this risk."'' The
Lewis, Elliott, and Nehrenz courts concluded that the labs did owe a duty. The duty
owed was not to protect the employee's employment, but rather to perform the tests
"in a competent and non-negligent manner."'05 The existence of such a duty should
be found: "Under general negligence principles a provider of services must (1)
possess the skill normally possessed by persons who provide such services for a
fee, (2) use reasonable care in performing the service, and (3) exercise his or her
best judgment."'
The Louisiana Supreme Court recognized such a duty in Barrie v. V. P.
Exterminators." In Barrie, a homeowner enlisted the services of a termite
inspector to inspect the home for termites. The report was to be used to facilitate
the sale of the house. The inspector negligently and erroneously reported that the
house was free from termites, and the result was a pecuniary loss to the purchaser.
The purchaser, who was not a party to the contract between the vendor and the
inspector, sued the inspector for negligent misrepresentation.
The theme in negligent misrepresentation cases "is that one is liable for
negligent disclosure if he has superior knowledge and knows the other party is
relying upon him for such knowledge."'" ' According to the comments to § 552 of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the duty of care owed by commercial
information providers is to observe a relative standard, defined in terms of the
intended use of the information weighed against the magnitude and probability of
loss which would result from incorrect information."" In Barrie, the Louisiana
104. Herbert v. Placid Refining Co., 564 So. 2d 371,374 (La. App. lIst Cir. 1990).
105. Lewis v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 588 So. 2d 167, 170 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991).
106. Marust & Galligan, supra note 47, § 21-1, at 451.
107. 625 So. 2d 1007 (La. 1993).
108. Maraist & Galligan. supra note 47, § 5-7(h), at 122.
109. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 cmt. (a) (1977).
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Supreme Court found this section of the Restatement to be compatible with the
duties encompassed by Articles 2315 and 2316 of the Civil Code.
Since the defendant in Barrie had knowledge of the prospective use of the
information, had a pecuniary interest in supplying the information, and held himself
out as a specialist, the court concluded that a duty to use reasonable care and
competence in obtaining the information and communicating it to the prospective
buyers of the dwelling existed as a matter of law."' A similar duty should be
imposed upon a drug testing laboratory who supplies information for pecuniary
gain.
Although decided before Barrie, a similar result was reached by the fifth
circuit in Colbert v. B.F. Carvin Construction Co."' In Colbert, a general
contractor and an architect both had contracts with the school board for certain
construction work. The contractor sued the architect for negligent preparation of
plans and specifications, failure to give additional instructions during the progress
of the work, and for withholding recommendation for payment until the contractor
did additional uncompensated for work, thereby causing a loss of profits on the
contractor's contract with the school board. Although the court concluded that
there was as yet no remedy in Louisiana for negligent interference with contract,
the court recognized a tort based upon a negligent professional undertaking by an
architect causing foreseeable economic harm to the plaintiff's interests." 2
While the Colbert court discussed several Louisiana cases allowing similar
actions,' it quoted a California case for the rationale that liability should be
imposed because the supervising architect has a significant amount of control over
the contractor." 4 The court found that itwas this control, "tantamount to a power
of economic life or death over the contractor," thatjustifies the imposition of a duty
to perform his functions without negligence as they affect the contractor.'" The
Colbert court also discussed a Minnesota decision" 6 which concluded that an
engineer owes a duty to the subcontractor even in the absence of contractual
privity, noting that the prevailing rule in most jurisdictions recognizes the liability
110. Barrie, 625 So. 2d at 1018.
111. 600 So. 2d 719 (La. App. S Cir. 1992). writ denied, 604 So. 2d 1309 (La. 1992).
112. Colbert, 600 So. 2d at 719.
113. R & R Enter. v. Riven & Gulf Marine Survey, 476 So. 2d 12 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985);
Impressive Builders v. Ready Mix, Inc., 535 So. 2d 1344 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988); Alley v. Courtney,
448 So. 2d 858 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984), writ denied, 450 So. 2d 360 (La. 1984); Farrell Constr. v.
Jefferson Parish. 693 F. Supp. 490 (E.D. La. 1988). rev'd on other grounds. 896 F.2d 136 (5th Cir.
1990); Standard Roofing Co. v. Elliot Const., 535 So. 2d 870 (La. App. I st Cir. 1988), writ denied, 537
So. 2d 1166 (La. 1989); S.K. Whitty & Co. v. LL Lambert, 576 So. 2d 599 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991),
writ denied, 580 So. 2d 928 (La. 1991); Gurtler, Herbert & Co. v. Weyland Mach. Shop, 405 So. 2d
660 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981), writ denied. 410 So. 2d 1130 (La. 1982).
114. Colbert, 600 So. 2d at 724 (citing United States v. Rogers & Rogers, 161 F. Supp. 132, 136
(S.D. Calif. 1958)).
115. Colbert, 600 So. 2d at 724.
116. Waldor Pump v. Orr-Schelen-Maycron & Assoc., 386 N.W.2d 375 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
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of professional service providers who are negligent in the provision of services."'
The Minnesota court found the engineering firm "liable in negligence to those who
foreseeably relied on its professional services.""a
The Colbert court also discussed Westerhold v. Carroll,"9 a Supreme Court
of Missouri decision adopting a balancing test to be applied on a case by case basis
to determine whether in a specific case the defendant will be held liable to a third
person not in privity. The factors to be balanced included "the extent to which the
transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him,
the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the
connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, and the policy
of preventing future harm."'1'2 Noting that this was not a case where the architect
was being exposed to unlimited liability to an unlimited number of persons, the
Colbert court adopted the Westerhold balancing test and concluded that the petition
stated a cause of action.
21
The foreseeability of the harm resulting from an erroneous test is one evident
aspect of the duty equation." The employer usually has no expertise in drug
testing, and it is foreseeable that the employer will rely on the results and
recommendations of the testing laboratory. It is also foreseeable that the employer
will take "severe action in response to the misleading reports."'23 It is even
foreseeable who the potential plaintiffs will be, since the laboratory knows
precisely who is being tested for precisely which employers. As such, a duty
should be found based upon the foreseeability of the harm that will result as a
direct result of any negligent testing that produces a false positive.
A legal duty to perform drug testing in a non-negligent manner could also be
found based on Louisiana Revised Statutes 49:1005, which imposes minimum
guidelines to be followed by drug testing laboratories in many circumstances. 24
117. Colbert, 600 So. 2d at 724 (citing Waldor Pump v. Orr-Schelen-Mayeron & Assoc., 386
N.W.2d 375, 376-77 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)).
i18. Colbert, 600 So. 2d at 724.
119. 419 S.W.2d 73 (Mo. 1967).
120. Colbert, 600 So. 2d at 724 (citing Westerhold v. Carroll, 419 S.W.2d 73, 81 (Mo. 1967)).
121. Colbert, 600 so. 2d at 725.
122. Manist & Galligan, supra note 47, § 5-1. at 101.
123. David W. Lockard, Comment, Protecting Medical Laboratories From Tort LiabilityforDrug
Testing-The Amorphous Concept of Duty, 17 J. Legal Med. 427, 453 (1996).
124. La. R.S. 49:1005 (Supp. 2000) provides:
A. Beginning June 1, 1991, all drug testing, except as provided for in R.S. 49:1008, of
individuals in residence in the state and all drug testing of samples collected in the state,
including territorial waters and any other location to which the laws of Louisiana ar
applicable, shall be performed in NIDA-certified or CAP-FUDT-certified laboratories, if
both of the following apply:
(1) If, as a result of such testing, mandatory or discretionary consequences will be
rendered to the individual.
(2) Drug testing is performed for any or all of the following classes of drugs:
marijuana, opioids, cocaine, amphetamines, and phencyclidine.
B. Drug testing as provided in this Subsection shall be performed in compliance with the
NIDA guidelines except as provided in this Chapter or pursuant to statutory or regulatory
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While the statute mandates that drug testing only be conducted in certified
laboratories that maintain certain procedures, it does not contain any provisions
concerning violations. Imposing liability on non-conforming laboratories would
serve as an enforcement mechanism for the statute. The determination of whether
a private remedy is implicit in a federal statute was considered in Con v. Ash."
In Con, the United States Supreme Court considered several factors, including
whether the plaintiff was one of the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted
and whether there was any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, to
create or deny such a remedy. 6 Here, while the statute is a state statute, the same
analysis should apply. The statutory regulation of drug testing procedures in
instances where an employee will suffer consequences based on the results of the
test benefits the employee who is tested more than any other party. It is the
employee who primarily suffers the harm of a false positive. Therefore a legal duty
owed to the employee should be found based on the statute.'"
2. The Duty Owed by the Laboratories Extends to the Persons Who Are
Tested
The next determination is whether this duty extends "to protect the plaintiff
against the particular risk that occurred, in the particular manner in which it
occurred. Put differently, does this defendant have a duty to protect this plaintiff
against this risk that occurred in this manner."'28 In the negligent drug testing cases,
the plaintiff is typically an at-will employee.'2 Employment-at-will precludes an
employee terminated due to a negligently administered polygraph or drug
examination from recovering from the employer.'" The rejection of a cause of
authority under R.S. 23:1081 et seq. and R.S. 23:1601 et seq. The cut off limits for drug
testing shall be in accordance with NIDA guidelines with the exception of initial testing for
marijuana. The initial cut off level for marijuana shall be no less than fifty nanograms/ML
and no more than one hundred nanogrns/ML as specified by the employer or the testing
entity. The Department of Health and Hospitals shall have the responsibility to adopt the
NIDA guidelines for purposes of governing drug-testing programs for specimens collected
in accordance with this Chapter. The Department of Health and Hospitals shall have the
responsibility for adoption of any subsequent revisions of the NIDA guidelines as of the
initial effective date of this Chapter.
125. 422 U.S. 66,95 S. Ct. 2080 (1975).
126. Id. at 78,95 S. Ct. at 2088.
127. See Ambrozv. Comhsker Square Ud., 416 N.W.2d 510 (Neb. 1987) (finding an employee
who was terminated for refusing to take a polygraph examination in violation of a state statute had
stated a cause of action against his former employer); see also Strahl v. Miller, 151 N.W. 952 (Neb.
1915).
128. Maraist & Galligan, supra note 47, § 5-1. at 101.
129. See La. Civ. Code art. 2747; Johnson v. Delchamps. Inc., 897 F.2d 808,810 (5th Cir. 1990).
writ denied; Ballaron v. Equitable Shipyards, Inc., 521 So. 2d 481 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988); Chauvin
v. Tandy Corp., 984 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1993); Overman v. Fluor Constr. Inc., 797 F.2d 217 (5th Cir.
1986); Varnado v. Roadway Express, 557 So. 2d 413 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990).
130. See Johnson v. Delchamps, Inc., 897 F.2d 808 (5th Cir. 1990) (no cause of action against an
employer for termination as the result of allegedly negligent administration of a polygraph examination
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action against the employer is justified, as the employer usually relies in good faith
upon the results of the testing laboratory.' Without a remedy against the
employer, terminated employees have asserted claims in negligence against testing
laboratories, with varying degrees of results. Some courts have relied on
employment-at-will to preclude recovery for "otherwise applicable tort claims
against employers or third parties.""' However, the fourth and fifth circuit cases
allowing recovery did not preclude recovery due to the employee's status as an at-
will.employee."3
The traditional policy concerns which precluded courts such as PPG from
extending the scope of the defendant's duty to encompass that plaintiff's harm are
simply not present in the drug testing context. Here, the terminated employee is not
a person whose contractual interests were incidentally harmed. To impose liability,
something more is needed to render the defendant liable." There must be some
negligence "toward the plaintiff's contract interest, for otherwise the defendant has
been guilty of no breach of duty to the plaintiff.""' Negligent drug testing is
certainly negligence directed at the employee's interest in employment. There is
an ease of association between the negligent testing and the employee's subsequent
termination. It is unreasonably risky to conduct employment related drug screens
in a negligent manner precisely because the person tested will be terminated (or at
least reprimanded in some fashion) if the test is positive. There is no limitless
extension of liability since the lab know exactly whom it tests. The lab should be
liable for any harm it inflicts upon those persons by virtue of a negligently
conducted test.
3. Public Policy Supports the Imposition of Liability Upon Negligent
Drug Testing Laboratories
Imposing a duty to perform non-negligently on drug testing laboratories is
supported by policy concerns. The enactment of Louisiana Revised Statutes
49:100536 expresses the public policy of Louisiana in maintaining minimum
standards in testing procedures. The imposition of liability is necessary to enforce
administered by a fellow employee). The fifth circuit found that while the employee maintained that
the negligent administration of the test was an independent tort, what she really complained of was the
discharge itself. Johnson, 897 F.2d at 810. The court found that employment.at.will controlled the
disposition of the case and affirmed the summary judgment for the employer. Id. at 811.
13!. Karen Manfield, Imposing Liability on Drug Testing Laboratories for "False Positives":
Getting Around Privily. 64 U. Chi. L Rev. 287. 295 (1997).
132. John Devlin, Reconsidering the Louisiana Doctrine of Employment at Will: On the
Misinterpretation of Article 2747 and the Civilian Case for Requiring "Good Faith" in Termination
of Employment, 69 Tul. L Rev. 1513, 1549 (1995) (emphasis added).
133. See supra text accompanying notes 87-95; see also Merrick v. Thomas, 522 N.W.2d 402
(Neb. 1994) (at-will-employee stated a cause of action in negligence against the Sheriff's Merit
Commission and against the County itself for negligent scoring of a merit test).
134. Carpenter, supra note 9, at 739.
135. Id. (emphasis added).
136. See supra text accompanying note 124.
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that legislative expression. The employee who is adversely affected has no cause
of action against the employer.'37 While the employer may have an action for
breach of contract against the lab, there is little incentive for an employer to pursue
such a remedy. Employers are not likely to demand higher quality services since
they are more concerned with decreasing costs and increasing efficiency through
cheaper providers of testing services. 3 They have little incentive to champion the
interests of an employee who purports to be the victim of a false positive.
The laboratories are the best risk avoiders. They have exclusive control over
the testing procedure, as they calibrate the equipment for various influences, set the
benchmark for normal and abnormal ranges, and establish their own quality control
procedures.' 39 Through their control of the scientific process used, the labs have
significant control over the number of false positives." Imposing liability for
negligent procedures creates an incentive for the lab to consider the costs of false
positives when deciding what procedures to use and how much money to spend on
precautionary measures. 4' The laboratories have a pecuniary interest in the
services they provide, and therefore the cost of providing reasonable care should
be incorporated into the cost of their services, not imposed on the innocent
employee, "who assumes all the risk and is in the weakest position to bargain or
directly benefit from the transaction. The failure to find protection in this situation
is fundamentally unfair."""
4. A Duty/Risk Analysis Is Competent to Limit This Liability
The Great Southwest court explored the policy reasons behind the reluctance
to recognize an action for negligent interference, rooted in part on what has been
called the "pragmatic objection": While physical damage can generally be limited,
economic harm often creates a chain reaction, and "may produce an unending
sequence of financial effects.""' The Great Southwest court noted that with few
exceptions, courts have generally "refused to cross the bright line that has
traditionally marked negligence claims for economic harm as off limits which
would require them to substitute a case-by-case adjudication on the issue of
proximate cause."'"
However, the Louisiana Supreme Court did in fact cross that bright line in
Barrie v. V.P. Exterminators, Inc. "s When negligent misrepresentation causes
only pecuniary loss, "the courts have found it necessary to adopt a more restricted
rule of liability, because of the extent to which misinformation may be, and may be
137. See supra text accompanying notes 129-131.
138. Manfield, supra note 1 31, at 293.
139. Lockard, supra note 123, at 453.
140. Manfield, supra note 13 1, at 292.
141. Id.
142. Lockard, supra note 123, at 453.
143. Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co. v. CNA Ins. Co., 557 So. 2d 966, 970 (La. 1990).
144. Id.
145. 625 So. 2d 1007 (La. 1993).
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expected to be, circulated, and the magnitude of the losses which may follow from
reliance upon it."'" In Barrie, the court recognized that the adoption of a set
theory of liability was not necessary, but rather "the case by case application of the
duty/risk analysis, presently employed by our courts" provides adequate protection,
"because the initial inquiry is whether, as a matter of law, a duty is owed to this
particular plaintiff to protect him from this particular harm."'147 It is this
individualized application of the duty/risk approach that should be utilized in
"negligent interference" cases.
IV. CONCLUSION
The decision whether to allow recovery for pecuniary loss resulting from non-
physical injury should be governed by application of the duty/risk analysis. The
solution cannot be found in adherence to bright line rules, as "In]either a blanket
denial nor an unlimited approval of recovery is appropriate." "48 There is no need
for the term "negligent interference with contract." The nomenclature should not
be used to categorically reject claims, but neither should it be invoked as an
independent basis for tort liability. The cases dealing with negligent drug testing
are but one example of a form of negligent interference which should be actionable,
not as a negligent interference action in and of itself, but rather as a negligence
action through the application of a duty/risk analysis. As the Supreme Court of
New Jersey noted: "In the end, the challenge is to fashion a rule that limits liability
but permits adjudication of meritorious claims.""' 9
The application of the duty/risk analysis ensures that liability is imposed where
public policy imposes a duty, while at the same time limiting liability to the
intended scope of that duty. Professor Robertson recognized the importance of
such an individualized approach:
Is a big, bright-line prohibitory rule, treating intangible economic losses
differently from other injuries, better tort policy than an approach
requiring the courts to confront the scope of liability issue for each type
of plaintiff and each item of claimed damages? [Professor] Leon Green
would not have found much difficulty with the question: "[R]ules of law
tend to become less and less dependable, and more and more fluid as
society becomes more complex and people more intelligent. The formula
can not be invented which relieves the judges and juries from the painful
necessity of using their good sense in deciding cases. Intelligence and
formulas soon part company. Rules will carry those who must pass
judgment only so far, figuratively speaking, into the neighborhood of the
problem to be passed upon, and then the judges must get off and walk."'"
146. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 cmt. (a) (1977).
147. Barrie v. V.P. Exterminators, 625 So. 2d 1007, 1016 (La. 1993).
148. Maraist & Galligan, supra note 47, 1 5-9, at 132.
149. People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated. Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107, 1 I (N.J. 1985).
150. Robertson. supra note 19. at 745-46 (citations omitted).
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This was the walk the Louisiana Supreme Court took in PPG and Barrie. And it
is this walk that should be continued as courts are faced with the issue of intangible
economic loss caused by a defendant's negligence, whether or not the loss includes
damage to a contractual relation.
Rebecca L Lear"
* Recipient of the first place award in the Louisiana State Bar Association Labor &
Employment Section Third Annual Essay Competition, 1999. The author would like to thank Professor
William R. Corbett, Rosemary Neal Hawkland Associate Professor of Law. Louisiana State University,
for his guidance as faculty advisor on this paper.
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